6 to get rid of the negative numbers by a linear transformation. Any test light is then represented by three positive coordinates, which we can think of as specifying the intensities of three "imaginary" primaries required for a match.
Since every test light can be assigned three coordinates, it has a location in a three dimensional space, with the axes representing the intensity of the corresponding primary.
If the (imaginary) primaries are those chosen by the Commission Internationale de l'Eclairage (CIE), and if the matching data is taken from a certain small group of Englishmen, viewing a stimulus of two degrees (about the size of a quarter at arm's length) against a dark neutral background, then the resulting space is the 1931 CIE tristimulus space, with every test light assigned three tristimulus coordinates. Because wavelength information is lost at the retina, due to the broad-band response of the cones, numerous physically different lights will have the same tristimulus values-the phenomenon of metamerism.
The tristimulus space is sometimes called a color space, which can be misleading.
It is a space of lights (or stimuli more generally 11 ), not colors. (The Natural Color System space is an example of true color space.
12
) Further, there isn't a natural way of transforming the tristimulus space into a color space. With the assumption that every light with the same tristimulus values has the same color, the tristimulus space could be converted into a literal color space by taking the items in the space to be the colors of the lights, whatever they are. But this assumption is not at all plausible. More importantly, the tristimulus space is not any kind of color appearance space-the space does not 11 Stimuli like colored papers can be assigned tristimulus values provided the illumination and viewing conditions are specified. 12 See, e.g., Hardin 1993: 116-9 . A color space is a comprehensive representation of the relations of similarity among colors. The representation is spatial in the sense that degrees of similarity are represented by distances in the space. Actual color spaces constructed by color scientists are motivated by concerns that often lead to a non-uniform relationship between distance in the space and perceived similarity among the colors. The various versions of the color solid are examples of color spaces, each of which makes its particular departures from the ideal because of the purposes for which it was constructed (see again Hardin 1993 ). In addition, there are variations among normal individuals in the relations of similarity and difference that they will perceive. At a sufficiently detailed level of description there may not be any two observers that share the same color space.
encode how a light would look. What is encoded is whether two lights will match-at least for the majority of us who approximate the "standard observer": the lights will match, or appear the same, just in case they have the same (or, more exactly, very close) tristimulus coordinates.
Consider a point (X, Y, Z) in the tristimulus space, and another point that lies n times further out on the same ray from the origin, (nX, nY, nZ) . The corresponding second light needs primaries in the same ratio for a match, but n more of each. Bearing in mind the three dimensions of color appearance (hue, saturation, and lightness), one might expect that the second light would appear brighter (lighter) than the first, with the same hue and saturation. This is indeed the case, to a close approximation. Hence, if the tristimulus space is reduced by one dimension by mapping each ray to a single point, we obtain a two dimensional space in which stimuli with different locations will appear to differ in hue and/or saturation. With a particular choice of axes, this space is displayed on the CIE chromaticity diagram, which is often annotated with the approximate color appearance of the stimuli, as in figure 1.
figure 1: 1931 CIE chromaticity diagram
The chromaticity coordinates (x, y) are derived from the tristimulus coordinates (X, Y, Z) as follows: x = X/(X+Y+Z), y=Y/X+Y+Z; (x, y) specifies the chromaticity of the corresponding light. The spectral (single-wavelength) lights are arranged around the horseshoe-shaped line, from spectral red on the bottom right (starting at 700nm, the approximate longwavelength end of the visible spectrum), green on the top, and violet on the bottom left (ending at 400nm, the short wavelength end). White is roughly in the middle: the chromaticity coordinates of the "equal energy white" light (marked 'E') are (1/3, 1/3). 13 The lights become progressively less saturated as they approach white, as illustrated by the location of pink; the spectral lights are therefore maximally saturated.
(In addition to the compression due to ignoring brightness, metamerism ensures that there is a many-one relation between stimuli and chromaticity.) The chromaticity diagram has the nice property that the chromaticity of any mixture of two lights lies on the line connecting the chromaticities of the two lights. Since any light is a mixture of spectral lights, this means that all stimuli lie in the region spanned by the horseshoe and a line (the "purple line") connecting its two endpoints. The fact that many chromaticity coordinates have no corresponding physical stimulus is due to the use of "imaginary" primaries.
Bearing in mind the dangers of labeling the chromaticity diagram with color names, it is helpful to think of the "imaginary colors" outside the spectrum locus and purple line as more saturated instances of the hues that are found within them.
Confusion lines
As we mentioned at the beginning, there are two forms of red-green dichromacy. These are protanopia and deuteranopia: protanopes lack the L-photopigment, while deuteranopes lack the M-photopigment. (Tritanopes, the third kind of dichromat, lack the S-photopigment.) Consider a protanope. As one might expect, 700nm light at the far (red) end of the spectrum stimulates the L-cones and negligibly stimulates the M-or S-cones; 700nm light is (near-enough) the L-cone primary (or fundamental). Suppose we take a spectral light (say, one of 520nm) and mix it with 700nm light. The protanope will not be able to distinguish the second light from the first (provided the second contains the same intensity of 520nm light as the first), because the 700nm light will not affect the M-and S-cones, and the protanope has no L-photopigment. So, given the way mixtures are represented on the chromaticity diagram, a line drawn from 700nm to 520nm specifies the chromaticities of stimuli that a normal observer can distinguish, but will match for a protanope-one of the protanope's confusion lines. Repeating this procedure for other spectral lights results in an array of confusion lines all converging on 700nm, the copunctal (or confusion) point, as illustrated in figure 2.
figure 2: 4 protanope confusion lines
One of the four confusion lines shown is of particular interest. It passes through the white point E and ends in the vicinity of 495nm, marked 'N' on the diagram. Therefore a protanope will not be able to distinguish this region of the spectrum from a neutral white stimulus-495nm (or thereabouts) is the protanope's neutral point.
If two stimuli lie on the same confusion line, they will match (equating for brightness). The converse is also true. Suppose that two lights l 1 and l 2 lie on different confusion lines: l 1 from 700nm to λ 1 , and l 2 from 700nm to λ 2 . Then the first light has the same chromaticity as a mixture of light of wavelength 700nm and λ 1 , and the other as a mixture of 700nm and λ 2 . Now λ 1 and λ 2 will affect the M-and S-cones differently, otherwise they would lie on the same confusion line; adding an amount of 700nm light will make no difference, since that will not affect either the M-or S-cones. So the protanope will be able to distinguish l 1 and l 2 . Hence, two stimuli lie on the same confusion line iff they match.
Similarly, deuteranopes and tritanopes will have their own distinctive confusion lines and neutral points. Since light of 400nm stimulates the S-cones but not the M-or Lcones, the copunctal point for a tritanope will be (near-enough) at 400nm. However, because there is no light that just stimulates the M-cones the copunctal point for a deuteranope lies outside the region of real colors, at about (.9, 0): the M-cone primary is, like the CIE primaries, "imaginary". A deuteranope's neutral point is a little greener than a protanope's, at about 500nm.
The theoretical basis for the discrimination data just presented is entirely at the receptor level, with the following very simple assumption connecting receptor activity and discrimination. In the sort of matching experiments described two stimuli are discriminable just in case they have the same effects on the receptors. (For simplicity, we are ignoring the phenomenon of "just-noticeable differences".) No assumptions were made about the way color information is processed in the brain; in fact, even the dimensions of color appearance were ignored. Admittedly, the CIE chromaticity diagram has some labeled color regions to aid understanding, and it is intended to differentiate between stimuli with a different hue and/or saturation, but none of this information is necessary to predict matches.
Clearly, then, discrimination data cannot predict how things look to a dichromat.
For all the discrimination data say, a green 510nm light looks to a dichromat exactly as an orange 620nm light looks to a normal trichromat, or looks grey, or even looks to have a hue that normals never see. To make progress, different kinds of data are needed.
Similarity
Perceptual tasks involving arranging stimuli by similarity can help, but only up to a point. 
Color language
One obvious way of getting information about perceived hue is simply to ask the colorblind how things look. If, as the Reduction View has it, satsumas look yellow to deuteranopes, not orange, won't they admit this when questioned? Perhaps surprisingly, the matter is not this simple.
The color-blind, like the blind and those with other sensory deficits, learn native languages in their entirety, not some subset with the terms corresponding to their deficit subtracted. In the case of color blindness, where many individuals with the disorder are unaware of their condition, not only are a full set of color terms learned but they are applied to objects on the basis of how those objects look. That is, color terms like 'red'
and 'blue' function for the color-blind much as they do for those with normal trichromatic vision. It isn't true, as Hacker claims, that the red-green color-blind "cannot use ['red' and 'green'] correctly in the way that we do, and will characteristically eschew their use " (1987: 152) . Of course, the color-blind will sometimes mislabel the colors of things, but they will call tomatoes 'red' and grass 'green'. And neither do their everyday mistakes with color terms expose them as especially noteworthy linguistic deviants, contrary to Hacker's suggestion: the normally sighted also misapply terms for shades, especially relatively unusual ones like 'teal' and 'puce'.
In the course of my application to the sciences, that of optics necessarily claimed attention; and I became pretty well acquainted with the theory of light and colours before I was apprized of any peculiarity in my vision. I had not, however, attended much to the practical discrimination of colours, owing, in some degree, to what I conceived to be a perplexity in their nomenclature…With respect to colours that were white, yellow, or green, I readily assented to the appropriate term. Blue, purple, pink, and crimson appeared rather less distinguishable; being according to my idea, all referable to blue. I have often seriously asked a person whether a flower was blue or pink, but was generally considered to be in jest.
Notwithstanding this, I was never convinced of a peculiarity in my vision, till I accidentally observed the colour of the flower of the Geranium Zonale by candlelight, in the autumn of 1792. The flower was pink, but it appeared to me almost an exact sky-blue by day; in candle-light, however, it was astonishingly changed, not having then any blue in it, but being what I called red, a colour which forms a striking contrast to blue. (Dalton 1977: 520) Notice that Dalton refers to a broad range of colors and that evidently his application of color terms to ordinary objects was not so eccentric as to convince him of the "pecularity" in his vision. Even his expertise in "the theory of light and colours" was not enough, with the discovery of his color blindness happening by chance.
Still, the color-blind face difficulties in using color terms, as Dalton recounts. As noted in the previous section, the perceived similarities among colored objects differ markedly between dichromats and trichromats (see again figure 2 in §2.2). Consequently the perceptible difference between, for example, objects correctly labeled 'cobalt' and those correctly labeled 'violet', is not at all obvious to dichromats. As Dalton saw it, there were just too many words marking overly subtle distinctions in certain regions of color space. However, despite his "perplexity" about nomenclature, Dalton appears to have used color language with tolerable accuracy.
Dalton's linguistic behavior in the greenhouse and potting shed suggests, if
anything, that his color vision was near-enough normal. In fact, more careful investigation of his linguistic behaviour would probably have reinforced this incorrect conclusion. Jameson and Hurvich (1978) asked dichromatic subjects to name the Farnsworth-Munsell caps. The chosen names were quite similar to those of normal subjects. One deuteranope, in particular, behaved exactly like someone with normal color vision. Bonnardel (2006) required subjects to name 140 colored chips, presented individually against a grey background in random order using eight basic color terms.
The agreement of the two deuteranopic subjects with a typical normal classification was 66% and 72%, respectively.
Further, dichromats associate the correct similarity relations with color terms. In addition to the perceptual similarity task involving pairs of colors (see the previous section), Shepard and Cooper (1992) also elicited judgments of similarity using just pairs of color names. They found a circular similarity space that strongly resembled the similarity space of normal subjects.
So if dichromats can tell us how things look to them, the circumstances must be carefully chosen. In particular, the subjects must be able to set aside years of trying, and largely succeeding, to speak with the trichromatic majority. Consider the hue circle; in particular, the hue circle devised by the nineteenth century French chemist Michel
Chevreul, divided into 72 sectors of equal angle: clockwise from top, green-olive-yelloworange-red-purple-violet-blue-turquoise, and back to green. 16 Suppose we showed Chevreul's circle to a red-green dichromat who was aware of his deficit and explained to him the question of this paper. How would he describe the circle's colors?
William Pole, a professor of civil engineering at University College London, tried this experiment on himself, shortly after Chevreul had published his "Cercle Chromatique":
Now if I follow the Chevreul circle, starting from red [at the bottom], and going round, in the direction of a watch-hand, towards blue, in every division which I pass, the sensation of yellow becomes fainter and fainter…until very soon the yellow disappears altogether, and nothing but a dark grey or perfectly colourless hue remains…the blue I see perfectly, but the various tints of violet are to me only a darkened blue…at about the second or third division beyond "bleu vert," the blue has entirely disappeared, and nothing is left but a neutral grey. Beyond this the illumination begins to increase again, and at the same time a sensation of antagonistic in the following sense: the output of the red-green channel, for example, is either biased towards red, or biased towards green, or at the balance point that is neither biased towards red or green. 18 The output of the red-green channel depends on the difference of the output of the L-and M-cones (which we can label 'L' and 'M'). Then (ignoring units, scaling, and other complications), if L-M>0 then the red-green channel is biased towards red, if L-M<0 it is biased towards green, and if L=M then it is at the balance point. Similarly for the yellow-blue channel, which takes inputs from all three cone types: if (L+M)-S>0 it is biased toward yellow, if (L+M)-S<0 it is biased toward blue, and if (L+M)-S=0 the yellow-blue channel is at the balance point. The S-cones make no contribution to the white-black channel, which becomes more biased towards white as L+M increases. (All this is at best considerably oversimplified, but it will do for our purposes.)
Because deuteranopes and protanopes have, respectively, no M-and L-cones, one would expect them either to have non-functioning red-green channels, or else to lack them altogether. (This will be discussed further in §5.4 below.) Similarly, the yellow-blue channel should be either inoperative or absent in tritanopes.
However, plausibly a deuteranope or protanope will have functioning yellow-blue and black-white channels. Hence opponent process theory leads naturally, if not inevitably, to a vindication of Pole and the Standard Reduction View: the colored world of deuteranopes and protanopes is much like ours, but with red and green missing. Things look blue, yellow, white, black, and grey, but nothing looks red, purple, green, or turquoise. (See, e.g., Hurvich 1981 : 242-3, Hardin 1993 : 145, Kaiser and Boynton 1996 145.)
Unilateral and acquired dichromacy
The most direct source of data on color appearance for dichromats would be the testimony of a normal trichromat who became a dichromat for a day. This would require importing the experiences of a dichromat into the sensorium of a trichromat, which might sound medically impossible, if not conceptually confused. However, there are two actual conditions that resemble this procedure. The endpoint is often complete blindness rather than color blindness. The impairments also need not be the straightforward loss of color discrimination seen in the inherited dichromacies. For example, some acquired color vision defects take the form of chromatopsia, in which an endogenous color is added to the perceived object color (Krastel and Moreland 1991) . Although the development of impairment is often rapid enough to be noticeable to subjects there is no useful published data on color change deriving from acquired dichromacy. This is presumably due to the rarity of the condition and the difficulty of making color comparisons over time periods of weeks to months.
Acquired dichromacy is of little help, then. However, the evidence from unilateral protanopia and deuteranopia supports the Standard Reduction View. 
The Standard Reduction View
So far, we have seen that the Standard Reduction View has a lot to be said for it (we will now drop 'Standard' when the context makes it clear). This section elaborates the Reduction View further, ending with a discussion of three problems. The first two are only apparent; the third is more serious.
21 20 Unilateral tritanopia is a different story. There are no well-characterized cases of congenital unilateral tritanopia and the cases of acquired unilateral tritanopia that have been reported do not fit any simple version of the Reduction View (Graham et al. 1967 , Alpern et al. 1983 . In light of the very small number of cases it would be a mistake to place any great weight on this difficulty.Taken at face value, the reported cases seem to conflict with the predictions of the Standard Reduction View. On the other hand, unilateral tritanopes are willing to use standard color terms to characterize the appearance of stimuli presented to their tritanopic eye and they are willing to accept matches between stimuli presented to the dichromatic eye and the normal eye. These last two points provide support for the truth of some form of the Reduction View although not for the Standard version in particular. 21 A fourth problem for the Reduction View is posed by a cluster of empirical results. In color naming experiments putative dichromats use red and green (or all eleven basic color terms) in systematic and repeatable ways (Scheibner and Boynton 1968 , Wachtler et al. 2004 ). It is not entirely clear how much of the color naming performance can be explained on the basis of color naming strategies adopted by dichromats living in a trichromatic culture. In addition some putative dichromats are trichromatic for larger stimuli (Smith and Pokorny 1977) . Although the interpretation of the results of these and similar
The Reduction View elaborated
Let us stick to protanopes for ease of illustration. The Reduction View tells us what the range of perceivable colors is for a protanope-the protanope's gamut. If we take a familiar three-dimensional color space, with the colors arranged along two-dimensions of hue (red-green and yellow-blue), and one achromatic dimension (black-white), then the protanope's color space is just a two-dimensional plane spanned by the yellow-blue and white-black axes. However, what this doesn't tell us is how particular stimuli look to a protanope. For all that's been said, a protanope might see a banana as blue.
However, once the Reduction View is granted, this further issue is reasonably tractable. Certain stimuli in a normal will keep the red-green channel in balance; plotted on a chromaticity diagram these stimuli will be all and only those that are mixtures of spectral unique blue (approximately 475nm) with white, and spectral unique yellow (approximately 580nm) with white-the gamut of the protanope, consisting of the variously saturated shades of unique blue and unique yellow (ignoring lightness). Since mixtures lie along straight lines, the stimuli that keep the red-green channel in balance will lie on the curve consisting of the line connecting 475nm with the white point E (or thereabouts), and the line connecting E with 580nm. As far as the appearance of these stimuli go, the normal trichromat's red-green system seems to be irrelevant. Hence these stimuli, as displayed in figure 3 below, should (at least approximately) appear the same to a protanope (and, by the same token, to a deuteranope) as they do to a normal.
experiments is not straightforward it may be the case that inputs from the rods are capable of driving an extra color channel (Buck et al. 2006) . For reasons of space we will set these complications aside.
figure 3: gamut for protanopes and deuteranopes (on Standard Reduction View)
With the usual rule of thumb connecting color appearances (in the viewing conditions of the color matching experiment), figure 3 may also be taken approximately to represent how stimuli lying on the two lines meeting at E look to a protanope.
But that's not all the stimuli, of course-what about the rest, the vast majority?
The facts about confusion lines mentioned in §2.2 provide the answer. Take some stimulus T, say one in the purple region of the diagram. The protanope will not be able to distinguish between T and a stimulus S whose chromaticity coordinates are at the intersection of the confusion line passing through T, and the curve in figure 3 , as illustrated in figure 4.
infer that they exclude one another. Consider, as an analogy, the names 'Bill' and 'Ben', which refer to certain individuals who happen to be, respectively, the man who has (exactly) seven cats, and the man who has (exactly) six cats. Bill and Ben "exclude" each other: if the visitor at the door is Bill he isn't Ben. However, information about the visitor encoded using 'Bill' is not going to allow us to draw this conclusion: we might know that the visitor is Bill and yet still reasonably wonder whether the visitor is Ben. On the other hand, switching from names to descriptions makes a useful inference available: 'The visitor is not the man who has six cats' is a logical consequence of 'The visitor is the man who has seven cats'.
If one sees unique yellow and also sees orange, one is then in a position to know that if something is unique yellow it is not orange. How could these two colors be represented in a way that would permit this conclusion to be drawn? The way 'unique yellow' is defined gives a clue: as Hardin puts it, unique yellow is "a yellow that is neither reddish nor greenish " (1993: 39) . Suppose that when one sees an object x as unique yellow (that is, when one one sees unique yellow), x is represented as being yellow but neither reddish nor greenish. And suppose that when one sees orange (that is, one sees an object y as orange), y is represented as, to use Hardin's phrase, "some degree reddish and also [as] some degree yellowish", with these two components of "chromatic strength" being roughly equal (39). Then this would explain how seeing these colors puts one in a position to know that they exclude each other: given this kind of chromatic perceptual coding plus a bit of logic, it follows that if something is unique yellow it is not orange.
Having independently motivated this claim about the way colors are represented, we can make a second attempt to reach the Alien View. If unique yellow is represented as a yellow that is neither reddish nor greenish, then seeing unique yellow by itself should put one in a position to know that it is not reddish, hence not reddish and yellowish in roughly equal proportion, hence not orange. But someone who only sees unique yellow (and unique blue) could not know solely on the basis of color experience that if something is unique yellow then it is not orange. So: someone who sees unique yellow and unique blue must also see other colors, and therefore the Alien View is true.
The chief problem with this argument lies in the last step, which combines one premise with another that varies inversely in plausibility. Why do we think that seeing unique yellow and unique blue alone is insufficient to know that unique yellow excludes orange? Because that information is apparently not present in the experiences of seeing unique yellow and unique blue. Contrariwise, if we have convinced ourselves by some philosophical argument that seeing unique yellow supplies the information that it excludes orange, then we have no reason to maintain that someone who sees only unique yellow and unique blue is not thereby in a position to know that unique yellow excludes orange.
Basically the same problem afflicts the first argument for the Alien View. One of its two premises, Revelation (-) , was derived from Revelation (in the strong form given above), and has no apparent support without it. Suppose we have convinced ourselves of the truth of Revelation: the nature of unique yellow is completely exposed by an experience of seeing that color, and so seeing unique yellow is sufficient to know that it is more similar to orange than to green. The third premise of the argument was that someone who sees only unique yellow and unique blue is not in a position to know this fact about the essence of unique yellow. However, establishing Revelation, and so Revelation (-) , removes any reason to believe the third premise.
The Reduction View revisited and revised
The only obstacle to the Reduction View is the problem of hue misperception. This section argues that it can be removed.
Opponent processes and the Reduction View again
Let us return to the argument in §2.5 that leads from the opponent process theory to the Reduction View, and make it more explicit.
1. A red-green dichromat's chromatic information (or misinformation) about a stimulus is supplied solely by his (essentially normal) yellow-blue channel, since he has no functioning red-green channel.
2. Either the dichromat's yellow-blue channel is biased towards yellow, or it is biased towards blue, or it is in balance.
information that q is just to conjoin these two propositions. But then we get the result that the perception of orange is the perception of yellow&red, which is wrong-an orange satsuma is neither yellow nor red.
It might be objected that our assumption that when the yellow-blue channel is biased towards yellow it supplies the information that the stimulus is yellow is oversimplified: we have ignored the fact that the yellow-blue channel supplies information about degrees of yellowness and blueness. (Something like this complication is required, because when a stimulus is seen as slightly reddish-yellow, say, the red-green channel is slightly biased towards red and the yellow-blue channel is more heavily biased towards yellow; cf. Hardin on "x percent red and y percent yellow" (1993: 120).) But adding this complication makes no difference. Suppose that having some "degree of yellowness" or having "non-zero percent yellow"-whatever these expressions mean, exactly-entails being yellow. Then the argument from the opponent process theory to the Reduction View is essentially unchanged, and so is our objection against premise (3).
Suppose, on the other hand, that having some "degree of yellowness" or having "nonzero percent yellow" does not entail being yellow. Then premise (3) is false to begin with.
If yellow-blue channel is "biased towards yellow" it does not-contrary to what the terminology suggests-signal that the stimulus is yellow. What does it signal instead?
In a normal trichromat the channel is positive just in case the stimulus looks to have a hue from that half of the hue circle that starts in the yellowish-reds next to unique red, and runs through orange, yellow, and yellow-green, stopping just short of unique green. In short: just in case the stimulus looks (even a tiny bit) yellowish. 32 Hence, if the yellowblue channel is biased towards yellow it signals that the stimulus is yellowish, a superdeterminable of the determinable yellow. Similarly, if the channel is negative it signals that the stimulus is bluish. The yellow-blue channel is misnamed-it should really be called the yellowishness-bluishness channel.
The Revised Reduction View
If the flawed argument from the opponent process theory is repaired to accommodate the fact that the yellow-blue channel supplies information about yellowishness and bluishness, not yellowness and blueness, then it supports the Revised Reduction View.
On the Standard Reduction View, a red-green dichromat sees objects as either unique yellow or unique blue. On the Revised Reduction View, a red-green dichromat sees objects as either yellowish or bluish. and since they are yellowish, they are not misperceived. The ancient "yellow-blue" system of color vision is not excessively error prone after all, since the hues it detects are the more inclusive yellowishness and bluishness, not the relatively exclusive yellowness and blueness.
Hue magnitudes
The Revised Reduction View can be further elaborated and explained with the aid of the hue magnitude account of the visual representation of colors in Byrne and Hilbert 2003. 33 In the terminology of that paper, there are four hue magnitudes, R, Y, B, and G, which come in degrees like length and temperature. 'Yellowishness' was used earlier to stand the property of having some degree or other of the Y magnitude; since context will disambiguate, we can use 'yellowishness' also to stand for the Y magnitude, and similarly for the other hue-ish terms.
When one sees an object as unique yellow it is represented as having a degree of yellowishness that is 100% of its total hue, the sum of its degrees of all the hue magnitudes. When one sees an object as orange it is represented as reddish to a degree that is roughly 50% of its total hue, and yellowish to the remaining degree.
This explains, incidentally, our knowledge of color exclusion (compare the proposal discussed in §4.3): if something is 100% yellowish it can't be roughly 50% yellowish, and so isn't orange.
The hue magnitude account is independent of the opponent process theory, which
is not an account of the content of visual experience, but the two make a nice fit. The 33 See also Byrne 2003. yellow-blue channel provides information about degrees of yellowishness and bluishness, and the red-green channel provides information about degrees of reddishness and greenishess. Together, these two channels contribute, to the content of visual experience, the relative proportion of yellowishness (bluishness) and reddishness (greenishness).
Consider, again, a normal trichromat and a protanope looking at our satsuma.
Suppose that the trichromat's experience represents the satuma as having reddishness that is 40% of its total hue (the sum of the four hue magnitudes), and yellowishness that is 60% of its total hue. The protanope has no functioning red-green channel, and so the only two magnitudes represented by his visual experience are yellowishness and bluishness.
For him, the "total hue" of the satsuma is a quantity that is the sum of its degrees of yellowishness and bluishness: call that the satsuma's total reduced hue. Combining the hue magnitude account and the Revised Standard View, the protanope's visual experience represents, not that the satsuma has yellowishness that is 100% of its total ("unreduced") hue, but rather that it has yellowishness that is 100% of its total reduced hue (the sum of its yellowishness and bluishness). The satsuma, then, is not represented as unique yellow, but rather as having some degree or other of the yellowishness magnitude-that is, as yellowish.
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But is the red-green channel either inoperative or absent?
The above argument for the Revised Standard View made use of an assumption first introduced in §2.5, namely that in protanopes and deuteranopes either the red-green channel is present but makes no contribution to color perception, or else is absent. Is that assumption plausible?
Suppose, on the contrary, that a functioning red-green channel is present: it develops in every human being whether there are appropriate cone types to supply it or not, and its output contributes to color perception. One possibility is that the channel output is permanently biased-towards greenishness for protanopes and reddishness for deuteranopes. If so, then the Standard Reduction View is wrong: the two hues seen by protanopes are yellow-green and blue-green and the two deuteranopic hues are orange and purple. Another (arguably more likely) possibility is that dichromatic visual system adapts to the unvarying red-green signal by setting the red-green channel output permanently to neutral. This would vindicate the Standard Reduction View: when a protanope looks at a satsuma his experience represents that the satsuma has yellowishness that is 100% of its total hue; that is, that the satsuma is unique yellow.
If either of these possibilities obtain then dichromacy is a kind of pathology, not just a less discriminating form of color vision than the trichromatic condition. On the first possibility, for instance, a protanope's color vision system signals greenishness, no matter whether the seen object is greenish or not. This is not merely a matter of error, but also of complete insensitivity: veridical perception of greenishness is an accident, like a stopped clock that reads the correct time. And similarly on the second possibility: veridical perception of an object that is neither reddish nor greenish will be a fluke.
However, the available evidence supports the conclusion that congenital dichromats, at least, have no functioning red-green channel. First, a general rule of visual processing is that unchanging inputs are ignored. For example, if an image is stabilized on the retina it fades to grey (Martinez-Conde et al. 2004 ). This is why we don't perceive in ordinary circumstances the shadows cast on the retina by the veins in the eye. If dichromats have a red-green channel there is no reason to think its output would contribute to their color experience.
Second, congenital dichromats might well not possess a red-green channel at all.
Research on non-human color vision indicates that the processing of chromatic information, in particular, is not set by a pre-existing wiring diagram, but instead is driven by the kind of stimuli available. In some South American monkeys, M-and Lcone pigments are coded by two alleles on the X-chromosome. The males and homozygous females thus have only two cone pigments and are dichromatic;
heterozygous females have three and are trichromatic (Jacobs et al. 1993 ). (That is, heterozygous females are both retinally and functionally trichromatic.) Mice are normally dichromatic, but if an allele for a third cone pigment is inserted on the X-chromosome the heterozygous females will be trichromatic (Jacobs et al. 2007 ). This suggests that opponent channels emerge partly in response to the cone inputs, as opposed to being created independently.
Unilateral dichromacy again
According to the Revised Reduction View, red-green dichromats see yellowishness and bluishness, and not trichromatic hues like unique yellow and unique blue. Nevertheless, as we have seen, unilateral dichromats will describe stimuli presented to their normal eye exclusively as yellow and blue, and will accept matches between stimuli presented separately to their normal and dichromatic eyes. Is this a problem for the Revised Reduction View?
Not really. First, the Revised Reduction View does not obviously apply to unilateral dichromats. Central color processing and representation in unilateral dichromats, as opposed to bilateral dichromats, has developed in response to a mixture of dichromatic and trichromatic inputs. Because of this fact, it is a plausible conjecture that color is always represented by unilateral dichromats using the two-dimensional hue code of normal trichromats. If so, then some stimuli presented to a unilateral dichromats dichromatic eye really do look unique yellow and unique blue. This would explain why they accept matches between the two eyes, and use 'yellow' and 'blue' to label stimuli presented to the dichromatic eye. That the central mechanisms of unilateral dichromats may differ from those of bilateral dichromats presents a real problem in interpreting the data from unilateral dichromats, and has been appealed to, for example, to explain why the known cases of unilateral tritanopia deviate from the predictions of the Standard Reduction View (Alpern et al. 1983 ).
Second, even if unilateral dichromats are (improbably) cyclopean bilateral dichromats, and so see the bilateral's colors with their dichromatic eye, the matching and description data are consistent with the Revised Reduction View. Unless very careful measures are taken to ensure that subjects only accept complete perceptual matches, the fact that a subject accepts a match between two stimuli does not establish that they are perceptually identical, only that they are similar in a salient respect (see, for example, Arend and Reeves 1986 ). If we suppose that yellowishness and unique yellow are saliently similar, then matching experiments pose no difficulty. And given that the unilateral dichromat just has normal color vocabulary to describe stimuli presented to his dichromatic eye, it is not surprising that 'yellow' and 'blue' are the words of choice.
Summary conclusion
This paper has argued for the Revised Reduction View: red-green dichromats see the world as having two superdeterminable hues, yellowishness and bluishness. More cautiously: if dichromatic vision is a reduction of normal trichromatic vision, then the Revised Reduction View is true.
The colors we normal trichromats see are either determinables like yellow, orange, and blue, or determinates like canary yellow, coral, and navy blue. Red-green dichromats do not see any of these colors. In that sense, the vulgar are vindicated: redgreen dichromats are not just merely color deficient-they are color-blind.
